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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSIONS-DELAY OF PRELIMINARY HEARINGS: The Supreme Court of the United States in a five to four decision' handed
down June 27, 1949, hld that the use, at a trial for murder in a state court, of
a confession obtained by prolonged police interrogation violated the due process
clause, where the suspect was interrogated on four consecutive days during which
he was not permitted to see friends or relatives and was not informed of his right
to remain silent until he had undergone interrogation for such period. He was
not given a preliminary hearing until interrogation had produced a confession.
The delaying of the preliminary hearing violated a state statute 2 that required
persons arrested be given a prompt preliminary hearing. This decision reversed
3
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Turner.
The facts of the case briefly stated are as follows: Foe six months prior to
June 3, 1946 the police of Philadelphia were investigating the felonious death of
one Frank Andes; on June 3 Turner was arrested on suspicion of the homicide
and taken to the Homicide Division at the City Hall Building; the officers making the arrest had no warrant and did not tell Turner that he was being arrested;
he was interrogated in the afternoon and for three hours that night; on the next
day Turner was booked on the records as being held for questioning and was
interrogated for four hours in the afternoon; on June 5 he was interrogated for
four hours and for six hours the next day; on June 7 Turner was interrogated in the
afternoon and night; at eleven o'clock that night he confessed the homicide; the
next morning the officers began to reduce the confession to writing and later
interrupted this process to take the prisoner for a preliminary hearing before a
magistrate located in the same building.
During custody Turner was questioned at times by one officer and at times
by a group of officers. Turner was not permitted to contact friends or relatives;
was not informed of his right to remain silent; was not informed of his right to
counsel; but was falsely told the other suspects 4 had "opened up" on him.
At the trial Turner objected to the introduction of the confession in evidence
on the grounds that it was a product of police conduct of a nature condemned by
the Pennsylvania courts. The lower court admitted the confession in evidence, and
I Turner v. Commonwealth, 69 S. Ct. 1352 (1949).
2 53 P. S. 6858, P. L. 1187 11. In all cases of arrest . . . it shall be the duty of the police
officer or constable making the arrest to take the person arrested for a hearing to the office of the
alderman or magistrate nearest the place where said arrest took place . . . except for . . . arrests
for intoxication.
& 358 Pa. 350, 58 A.2d 61.
4 These were two alleged accomplices of Turner who also confessed and were later tried
and convicted.
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Turner appealed his conviction of first degree murder to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania which upheld the conviction. In Commonwealth v. Turner, supra,
Maxey, C. J., said as follows:
"There is nothing in our constitution or our statutes, or in the decisions
and opinions of this court in the last two and a quarter centuries of its
existence, requiring that a convicted murderer be turned loose upon
society merely because he had not been taken before a magistrate immediatedly after his arrest and because he was held five days in jail and interrogated a few hours each day by police officers without being given an
opportunity to consult with counsel or friends."
And later the Chief Justice goes on to say:
"Even if it should be decided in a given case that a prisoner was technically wronged by an officer's refusal to take him before a committing
magistrate almost immediatedly after his arrest for a felony, it does
not follow that under the American Constitutional System society must
be more grossly wronged by having the prisoner turned upon it after
he has confessed his guilt.
Just as in morals 'two wrongs do not make a right' so in law committing a wrong against the accused cannot be righted by committing a
wrong against society."
The highest Pennsylvania court indicated that Turner had received substantial justice; admitted that Turner was technically wronged; but decided that
he was not deprived of due process of law under our Constitution and statutes.
The supreme court seemed to anticipate an appeal of this case to the highest court
in the land when it said:
"We find nothing in any decision of the United States Supreme Court
applying the due process of law guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment
which would justify us in adjudging Turner's confession inadmissible
and which would thereby requirle his release from custody. The United
States Supreme Court has frequently declared in effect that a state's long
established interpretation of its own constitutional due process clause
is entitled to respect and great weight by the federal judiciary." 5
The Supreme Court of the United States brought the case before it to measure
against the requirements of due process the circumstances giving rise to the claim
and held that the admission of the confession in evidence against Turner was a
violation of due process of law. The highest federal court ruled that the Turner
case 6 was governed by the Watts v. Indiana case, 7 a companion case in which the
Court reversed the Supreme Court of Indiana for denying Watts due process when
it admitted into evidence against Watts a confession obtained under similar circumstances.
5 201 U. S. 140, 154.

6 Supra.
7 69 S. Ct. 1347 (1949).

RECENT CASES

In Turner v. Commonwealth8 the Supreme Court of United States said:
"Putting this case beside our considerations set forth in our opinion
in Watts v. Indiana,9 leaves open no other possible conclusion than that
petitioner s confession was obtained under circumstances which made
its use at the trial a denial of due process."
In Watts v. Indiana, supra, discussing the requirements of due process, the
court said:
"A confession by which life becomes forfeit must be the expression
of free choice. A statement to be voluntary of course need not be volunteered. But if it is the product of sustained pressure by the police it
does not issue from a free choice. When a suspect speaks because he is
overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical
or mental ordeal. Eventually yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product of the suction of interrogation and
therefore the reverse of voluntary. . . To turn the detention of an accused into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not
be extorted in open court with all its safeguards, is so grave an abuse
of the power of arrest as to offend the procedural standard of due
process.
"This is so because it violates the underlying principles in our
enforcement of criminal law. Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to
the inquisitorial system. Such has been the characteristic of AngloAmerican criminal justice since it freed itself from the practices borrowed by the Star Chamber. .."
The Court further stated that the due process clause assured appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken. It said that a coerced confession
was inadmissible in a criminal case even though the statements in it may be independently established as true.
Justice Douglas concurred specially and said that this case was but another
vivid illustration of the use of illegal detention to exact confessions. He stated that
any confession obtained during a period of illegal detention without arraignment
should be inadmissible under the due process clause.
It must be remembered that this was a five to four decision so it is very
necessary to review the dissenting opinion. Three Justices' ° dissented without
an opinion, in view of the considerations given the evidence by the state court.
Justice Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion in which he stated:
"If the state may arrest on suspicion and interrogate without counsel,
there is no denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits of the
constitutional guarantee of the right to the assistance of counsel...
8 Supra.
9 Supra.
10 Vinson C. J., Reed and Burton, JJ.
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I suppose the view one takes will turn on what one thinks should
be the right of the accused against the state. Is it his right to have judgment on the facts? Or is it his right to have judgment based only on such
evidence as he cannot conceal from the authorities who cannot compel
him to testify in court and can not question him before? Our system
comes close to the latter by any interpretation, for the defendant is shielded by safeguards as no other system of law except the Anglo-American
concedes to him."
Speaking of the constitutional limitations placed upon the powers of organized
society over the individual Justice Jackson said:
"I doubt very much if they require us to hold that the state may not take
into custody and question one suspected reasonably of an unwitnessed
murder. If it does, the people of this country must discipline themselves
to seeing their police stand helplessly by while those suspected of murder
prowl about unmolested. Is this a necessary price to pay for the fairness
which we know as due process of law? And if not a necessary one, should
it be demanded by this court? I do not know the ultimate answers to
these questions; but for the present, I should not increase the handicap
on society."
The majority of the Supreme Court of the United States conclude that
Turner, or any other individual in a similiar position, is entitled to one hundred
percent protection of the laws or he is being denied due process of law. Due process is not substantial compliance with all laws or compliance with a substantial
number of our laws. They indicate that the effects of turning a confessed murderer upon society are not nearly so great as to take the life of a prisoner found
guilty because of the use of a confession illegally obtained. A person reasonably
suspected of an unwitnessed murder who is taken into custody must be given all
the rights and privileges due him regardless of how much more difficult the task
of proving him guilty is made, and conversely, the authorities in charge shall
not make any minor infractions of the rules to make it easier for them to prove
him guilty.
The minority opinion states that society should not be burdened with confessed murderers running about unmolested. The phrase "due process of law,"
although elastic, is limited in its meaning and does not include within it a factual
situation which results in more probable harm to society than probable good to an
individual. The view of the Pennsylvania courts was not dissimilar to the minority view.
On retrial a jury of four men and eight women, after twenty minutes of deliberation, again found Turner guilty of murder in the first degree. 1
VIRGIL F. MORACA

11 The arguments again centered around police methods and the protection of the individual.
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TAXATION-POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER-SPIEGEL CASE: The
purpose of this case note is to discuss the attitude the Pennsylvania courts
will apparently take in view of the United States Supreme Court decision
in Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 335 U. S. 701,
69 S. Ct. 301, 93 L.Ed. 327 (1949). The Court, in a majority opinion by Mr.
Justice Black, held that a possibility of reverter in the settlor of a trust was to be
included in the gross estate for estate tax purposes.
In this case Sidney M. Spiegel made a transfer of certain stocks by deed of
trust. The trust income was to be divided among his three children as beneficiaries
during his life; if they did not survive him, to any of their surviving children.
Ht died in 1940. On his death the trust instrument provided that the corpus was
to be distributed in the same manner. No provision was made for distribution of
the corpus and its accumulated income should Mr. Spiegel survive all his children
and grandchildren. The Court held that he had a possibility of reverter in the
corpus and accumulated income and had to be included in the gross estate for
estate tax purposes.
The Court indicated that this could have been avoided if Mr. Spiegel had
made a bona fide transfer in which he absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably and
without possible reservation parted with all his title, all his possession, and all
his enjoyment of the transferred property. It was said further that after such transfer has been made the settlor must be left with no present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that title, and no right to possess or enjoy
the property then or thereafter. In other words, tht transfer must be immediate,
out and out and unaffected by whether the grantor lives or dies. There was a
strong dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Burton with Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr.
Justice Frankfurter concurring in which five alternatives were suggested.
Three months later the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided the case of
Irish v. Irish, et al., 361 Pa. 410, 65 A.2d 345 (1949). This case arost from a
a bill in equity to reform a trust.
On Aug. 29, 1941, Franklin C. Irish and his wife executed, delivered and
recorded an irrevocable deed of trust whereby real and personal property was conveyed to named trustees for the benefit of his wife, daughters, grandchild,
son-in-law, possible heirs and next of kin. The settlor, following the Spiegel case,
supra, discovered in reviewing the provisions of his deed of trust that through
the mistake and inadvertence of his scrivener, no provision was made in the deed
for disposing of the principal of the trust 'estate in the event that he should survive
all the named beneficiaries and their issue, if any, and if the settlor's daughter, in
such event, should fail to exercise power of appointment by will, in which contingency the principal of the trust would revert to him.
The defendants, the trustees named in the deed, joiried in the prayer of the

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Upon hearing, the lower court found that no interest of any person known
or ascertained would be affected by the decree prayed for, and it decided the following:
"First: Under the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, if
the named beneficiaries of said trust should predecease the trustor, without leaving issue then surviving, the principal of said trust would, by
operation of law, revert to the trustor.
"S'econd: A Pennsylvania court sitting in equity, has authority to
amend nunc pro tunc a voluntary but irrevocable trust in which the donor
did not reserve the right to modify or amend the instrument so that the
trust, as modified, does conform with the donor's intention at the time
he created the trust; and that this power is especially present where the
court finds that no interest of any party to the trust will be affected in
any way whatsoever other than the interest of the creator who is the
plaintiff in this case.
After seeming to approve the bill to reform the trust the lower court dismissed the bill for the following reason:
"In light of the Spiegel case it is important that the right to reform
instruments in the circumstances here present be determined by the
Supreme Court. We shall therefore refuse the relief sought so that the
plaintiff may appeal."
A decree was entered dismissing the bill and the case went to the Supreme
Court on appeal. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Allen M. Stearne, the court agreed
unanimously that in the event of the happening of the remote contingency recited
there would be a reverter. They also agreed that under appropriate circumstances
a court of equity may reform a deed. The court further stated:
"Whether the omission in the deed was in truth and in fact a mistake or inadvertence depends upon the findings of fact of a chancellor
who sees and hears the witness, and which, if approved by the court
en banc, would warrant a decree of reformation."
The decree dismissing the bill was reversed and the plaintiff (settlor) was
allowed to reform his deed of trust.
In view of this decision it seems that the Pennsylvania courts will be liberal
in allowing irrevocable deeds of trust to be reformed by the settlor to avoid the
situation that existed in the Spiegel case, supra, where the settlor died without
having adequate provision for the elimination of this possibility of reverter in
regard to the principal and accumulated income of the trust.
JOHN D. HOPPER
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NOVATION -

AGENCY - RELEASE OF AGENT OF UNDISCLOSED
PRINCIPAL BY NOVATION

In Joseph Melnick Building and Loan Association, to use, v. Melnick, 361
Pa. 328, 64 A.2d 773, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the agent
for an undisclosed principal was relieved from liability even though the disclosure
of the fact of agency and the identity of the principal was made after liabilities
were incurred. This freedom from liability was based, according to the court, upon
a novation. The facts of the case are complicated, but are, for that reason, given in
rather full detail in this note.
Appellee (William Rabinowitz) and appellant (Samuel Melnick), acting
as partners, bought certain properties. They gave mortgages to two companies
on these properties. Appellant then discovered that appellee had in fact been
acting for undisclosed principals, Abraham Rabonwitz and Ephraim Fruchbom.
After the disclosure of the agency an oral agreement was entered into by all the
parties, under the terms of which appellee's interest in the partnership would be
transferred to Abraham Rabinowitz and Ephraim Fruchbom. Appellee's interest
in the properties was transferred to them by deed. An oral agreement was then
reached to dissolve the partnership. The properties were divided. Later, due to
defaults, tht bonds were reduced to judgment and paid in full by appellant. The
judgments were marked to the use of appellant and assigned to him. He brought
suit against the principals and recovered a judgment for the entire contribution due
him. Appellant then made a compromise settlement agreement with the principals,
agreeing to release them if they would pay a substantial portion of the judgment
within a specified time. He reserved, however, all rights against appellee. The
principals complied with the agreement and the release was given. Appellant
then sued appellee.
The lower court ruled that since appellee had been acting as agent for the
undisclosed principals and since they were released under the compromise agreement, appellee, the agent, was also released. The Supreme Court decided that as
there was no election until one satisfaction is had and as the third person can
proceed against the agent or the principal or both, their liability is joint and several.
The reservation of the rights of appellant against app'ellee then becomes significant,
for the Pennsylvania rule is well established that a release of one of joint and several
debtors is not a release of the others where the release shows an intention to hold
the remaining debtors. The lower court, therefore, had erred in the basis of its
findings. But the Supreme Court went on to inquire as to what rights appellant
had against appellee, for as the court stated, if appellant had no rights against
appellee the reservation was of no significance.
It was here that the idea of a novation entered the case. The court put the
matter as follows, p. 336:
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The controlling question is: what effect did the agreement between
appellant and Abraham Rabinowitz and Ephraim Fruchbom (where
the latter two persons were substituted in place of appellee as partners
of appellant) have upon the rights of appellant and appellee inter-se?
This agreement, as between the parties, effected a novation with regard to
the prior legal relationship existing between appellant and appellee. By
it appellee was discharged from any duty he owed to appellant. Abraham
Rabinowitz and Ephraim Fruchbom were substituted as appellant's partners and were obligated to carry out the duties theretofore imposed upon
appellee.
Sec. 424 of Restatement, Contracts, was then adopted by the court as one of its
definitions of the term novation. The Restatement defines a novation as "a contract that discharges immediately a previous contractual duty or a duty to make
compensation, and creates a new contractual duty, and includes as a party one
who neither owed the previous duty nor was entitled to its performance." The
court, quoting from Wright v. Hanna, 210 Pa. 349, 59 A. 1097, stated that the
essentials of novation are the displacement and extinction of the prior contract
and a substitution of a new contract. The new contract needs a sufficient consideration and the consent of the parties thereto. The court concluded that the appellant
had no rights against the appellee due to the novation, and therefore the reservation
in the agreement of release was nugatory.
In this case it is important to note that the principals were undisclosed as
far as appellant was concerned until he had incurred liability. Appellee and appellant were partners and appellee in fact was the agent of Abraham Rabinowitz
and Ephraim Fruchbom in this partnership. It would seem that the rules relating
to undisclosed principals would apply in the creation of the partnership, aind this
would mean that the principals were bound before the substitution took place as
well as afterwards. This being so, the definition given by the Restatement, Contracts, cannot be applied. It requires a new contractual duty including as a party
one who neither owed the previous duty nor was entitled to its performance. The
undisclosed principals did owe the previous duty; they were bound by the acts of
their agent within his power, and there is no indication in this case that the
agent exceeded his power. Whether or not the undisclosed principals were entitled
to the performance of the contract is beyond the scope of this note, but it does
seem that the appellant could have refused to be a partner with them.
Under this view the problem of consideration becomes important. The principals were already bound. The agreement, if it released the appellee, must be
supported by a sufficient consideration. The court indicates that this consideration moved to the appellant when the principals were substituted for the appellee.
But, although the appellant would suffer a detriment when he released the appellee, the appellant would not receive any benefit due to the substitution. If the
bonds have been reduced to judgment before the appellant learned of the existency of the agency or the identity of the principals, he would have been able to
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proceed against the principals for contribution. Therefore the appellznt gained
nothing from the agreement. This does not mean that the agreement could not
have been a novation, but it is not the type of novation defined in the Restatement.
Williston on Contracts, Vol. 6, R'evised Edition, sec. 1866, p. 5245, after explaining the difficulty of finding consideration in a simple novation, goes on to state:
"The above principles (simple novatlon) are exemplified. . .; where a
new partnership assumes the debts of an old firm which is freed from
liability; or a remaining partner assumes the firm's liabilities and the
withholding partner is expressly or impliedly discharged. In the last two
examples, it is true that because of the joint nature of the original obligation if the change in debtors is by dropping one out, no new debtor
has been introduced and at least one court has held that no novation
could take place (Marshall Field & Co. v. Fiskin, 180 Wis. 149, 193
N. W. 463); but since there is a change in debtors as well as a change in
the nature of the obligation, it seems preferable to regard the case as one
of novation."
The second example given above, although it does not involve an agent, does
involve a situation where no new party is introduced. Under such a view there
might be a novation in this case. But this once again depends upon the meaning
given to the term novation, and if the Restatement view is to be adopted, a
new party is required. In that portion of the opinion dealing with the novation
the court seems to feel that the principals were new parties. Yet in dealing with
the problem relating to the release the court affirms the Pennsylvania rule as to
undisclosed principals. At p. 334 they say:
"Many jurisdictions in the United States have adopted the view that
if, after learning of the existence of an undisclosed principal, the third
party obtains a judgment against the agent, there has been an election
and the principal is discharged. See: Restatement, Agency, Sec. 210 . . .
Pennsylvania, however, has not adopted this view. Where a party executes a release to an undisclosed principal (after full disclosure), he may
proceed against the agent until full satisfaction. This court has decided
that the third party has the option to proceed against either the agent or
his principal, or both, but is entitled to only one satisfaction."
And on p. 335:
'If under the Pennsylvania rule the third person may proceed against
either the agent or the undisclosed principal or both, the liability
is joint and several."
In other words, after deciding as a fact that the appellee was the principals' agent
and that the principals were undisclosed, the court announces these rules relating
to agency. The logical conclusion would seem to be that the appellant had, at
the moment the mortgages were given, any and all rights given by the subsequent
agreement.
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The court admits that the novation would have no effect on the rights of
the mortgagees, for they were not parties to the transaction, but the appellant, as
their assignee, could not assert their rights since he was a party to the novation.
In deciding this the court states that the third person (would he not be the appellant in this case?) acts upon the agent's credit and is not boqnd to yield up
his righs to hold the agent responsible merely because he discloses a principalwho
is also liable, but that, because of the novation, the appellant is estopped from
asserting a right which he surrendered. All this is sound except for the fact that
it merely bolsters the idea that the principals were liable from the start, and that
they were not parties who neither owed the previous duty nor were entitled to its
performance. In announcing these rules the court admits that the principals were
parties owing the previous duties, and if this is so, thre could be no novation according to the definition in the Restatement.
The result, however, seems just. This case was the final step in litigation involving a series of complicated fact situations which began in 1929. The agreement was made by the appellant, the appellee and the principals in 1925. There
seems to be an implied intention in the agreement to discharge the appellee, and
if this is so, then, since there was a change in debtors as well as a change in the
nature of the obligation, it is thL better view to regard the agreement as one of
simple novation.
JOHN WOODCOCK, JR.

